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Abstract. Today, security threats to operating systems largely come from network. Traditional discretionary access control mechanism 
alone can hardly defeat them. Although traditional mandatory access control models can effectively protect the security of OS, they 
have problems of being incompatible with application software and complex in administration. In this paper, we propose a new model, 
Suspicious-Taint-Based Access Control (STBAC) model, for defeating network attacks while being compatible, simple and 
maintaining good system performance. STBAC regards the processes using Non-Trustable-Communications as the starting points of 
suspicious taint, traces the activities of the suspiciously tainted processes by taint rules, and forbids the suspiciously tainted processes 
to illegally access vital resources by protection rules. Even in the cases when some privileged processes are subverted, STBAC can 
still protect vital resources from being compromised by the intruder. We implemented the model in the Linux kernel and evaluated it 
through experiments. The evaluation showed that STBAC could protect vital resources effectively without significant impact on 
compatibility and performance. 
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1 Introduction 
With the rapid development and increasing use of network, threats to operating systems mostly come from network, such 
as buffer overflows, viruses, worms, Trojans, DOS, and etc. On the other hand, as computers, especially PCs, become 
cheaper and easier to use, people prefer to use computers exclusively and share information through network. Though on 
a few occasions a user may permit someone else who is fully trusted to log in his/her computer from local, most of the 
time users share information via network. Therefore nowadays the threat to modern OSs does not come from local, but 
more from remote. 
Traditional DAC (Discretionary Access Control) in OS alone cannot defeat network attacks well. Traditional MAC 
(Mandatory Access Control) is effective in maintaining security, but it has problems of being incompatible with 
application software and complex in administration [1][2][3]. From 2000 to 2003, we developed a secure OS, which 
implemented BLP [5], BIBA [6], RBAC [7] and ACL. However, we found the same problems with the secure OS. Thus, 
the STBAC model is proposed with the following goals in mind. 
 Protecting vital resources: Even if some privileged processes are subverted, STBAC can still protect vital resources 
from being compromised. Vital resources in OS include important binary files, configuration files, directories, 
processes, user data, system privileges and other limited resources, such as CPU time, disk space, memory, network 
bandwidth and important kernel data structures. Since they are the valuable user data and foundation for OS to 
provide services, they usually become the final target of an intrusion. Even if an intruder gets the root identity, we 
can say that the intrusion has failed if the intruder cannot compromise the vital resources. 
 Compatibility: STBAC-enhanced OS is compatible with existing application software.  
 Simplicity: STBAC is easy to understand and administer. 
 High performance: STBAC is implementable with high performance. 
The STBAC model regards the processes using Non-Trustable-Communications as the starting points of suspicious taint, 
traces the activities of the suspiciously tainted processes by taint rules, and forbids the suspiciously tainted processes to 
illegally access vital resources by protection rules. 
  
Fig.1.  STBAC model 
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We implemented the STBAC model in the Linux kernel, and evaluated its capability of protecting vital resources, 
compatibility and system performance through experiments. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first 
describe the STBAC model and its four parts in 
Section 2. In Section 3, the protection capability, 
compatibility and simplicity of STBAC are 
analyzed. Section 4 presents the implementation 
details of the STBAC model in the Linux kernel. 
The evaluation results are shown in Section 5. In 
Section 6, STBAC is compared with related 
works. Finally, we draw the conclusion in 
Section 7. 
1. Model Description 
The STBAC model consists of four parts: Taint, 
Health, Vital and Protection, as shown in Figure 1, where each part is enclosed in a dashed circle. The rectangles indicate 
processes; the ellipses indicate files or directories; the diamonds indicate sockets; and the balls indicate any entities in OS, 
such as files, directories, sockets and processes. 
The Taint part, probably controlled by an intruder, consists of suspiciously tainted subjects (St), suspiciously tainted 
objects (Ot) and taint rules (TR). TR is categorized into TRsock-proc, TRproc-proc, TRproc-exe and TRexe-proc, and any St or Ot in 
Figure 1 has a solid dot on its upper left. The Vital part represents the vital resources that should be protected properly. It 
consists of vital objects that include Oconf, Ointe and Oavai, and vital rules (VR) that include VRproc-proc, VRdir-dir, VRproc-file 
and VRfile-proc. Any vital object in Figure 1 has a hollow dot on its upper left. The Protection part consists of three 
protection rules (PR): PRconf, PRinte and PRavai, which forbids St to illegally access vital objects. The Health part consists 
of health objects (Oh) and health subjects (Sh) that are not tainted or labeled as vital ones. We elaborate on the four parts 
of STBAC in the following sections. 
1.1 Taint 
As the intruder probably controls the St and Ot, STBAC labels them with suspiciously tainted flag (Ft), and traces St’s 
activities in OS kernel with taint rules. 
1.1.1 Taint Entities 
First of all, we define remote network communications with necessary security means as Trustable-Communications, 
e.g., the secure shell, and those without security means as Non-Trustable-Communications. Security means include 
authentication, confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and etc. 
Suspiciously Tainted Subject (St) is a subject that may be controlled by an intruder and may act for intrusion purposes. 
St is a process in general. For example, it can be a process using Non-Trustable-Communications, or a process of an 
executable file created by an intruder, or a process of an executable file downloaded from network, or the descendant 
process of the above processes. It can also be a process that communicates with the above processes, or a descendant of 
such a process. 
Suspiciously Tainted Object (Ot) is an object that is created or modified by an intruder, and may aid in the intrusion. 
Generally, Ot means either the executable file created and modified by St, or the process created and accessed by St, or 
the file and directory accessed by St. 
Both St and Ot are labeled with Suspiciously Tainted Flag (Ft). 
  
Table 1 Information flows 
1.1.2 Taint Rules 
Information flows between subjects and objects in OS are significant to OS 
security research [8] [9]. There have been several studies on the method of 
backtracking intrusions in kernel based on the dependency graph that depicts 
information flows [10~13]. With the dependency graph, the administrator can 
easily trace out all processes and files related to intrusion. STBAC adopts a 
similar approach to construct taint rules. The information flows that are possible 
to spread taint are depicted in Table 1. 
If we build taint rules based on Table 1, the number of tainted processes, files and directories can be very large. The main 
reason is that St will taint a vast number of Sts and Ots during its frequent file and directory operations. This may be 
exploited by the intruder to generate false dependencies [10], and eventually to aggravate system workload heavily. 
Although there are a lot of file and directory operations, most of them cannot spread taint. File and directory operations 
that can spread taint fall into two types: 1) creating, writing and executing executable files; 2) reading and writing files 
that may influence process actions. These files are important configuration files or data files. For the second type of 
operations, we can avoid spreading taint by setting important configuration or data files as integrity protected ones. Thus 
we can forbid St to write these files. So, we only need to treat the first type of operations as taint rule instead of the entire 
set of file and directory operations shown in Table 1. Therefore, we build taint rules as follows: 
Socket to Process Taint Rule ( ocessSocket tF Pr:TR Proc-Sock  ) depicts that the process using 
Non-Trustable-Communications may be breached or launched by the intruder. Thus it should be labeled with Ft. In 
contrast, the process using Trustable-Communications should not be labeled with Ft. 
Process to Process Taint Rule ( ocessocess tF PrPr:TR Proc-Proc  ) depicts that the process created by St or received 
communication message from St should be labeled with Ft. No doubt, the process created by St is dangerous, so it is 
regarded as St. By means of pipe, local socket, shared memory or message queue, St may control other process to serve 
for intrusion, thus the controlled process is also regarded as St. 
Process to Exe-file Taint Rule ( FileExecutableocess tFPr:TR Exe-Proc ) depicts that the executable file created or 
modified by St should be labeled with Ft. Executable files created by St may be hostile programs, such as programs 
downloaded from network. On many occasions, modifying or over-writing existing executable files is a way to leave 
backdoor, for example, using specially modified “ls”, “ps” and “netstat” to over-write existing command files.  
Exe-file to Process Taint Rule ( ocessFileExecutable tF Pr:TR Proc-Exe  ) depicts that the process that has executed or 
loaded Ot should be labeled with Ft. Suspiciously tainted command files, library files, or other executable files could be 
intrusion tools, so the process derived from them is dangerous. 
1.2 Vital 
The Vital part is the target for STBAC to protect, which consists of vital objects and vital rules. Vital objects include all 
kinds of vital resources, such as important user data, important system files or directories, limited system resources, and 
etc. Vital rules define the conditions to spread vital flags that are used to label vital objects. 
1.2.1 Vital Entities 
According to the information protection targets proposed in ITSEC [14], even if OS is subverted, STBAC should still 
protect the following three types of objects:  
Confidentiality Object (Oconf) is an object containing information that should be protected confidentially even if the 
system is breached. Generally, Oconf means a file or directory containing sensitive information. For example, 
“/etc/passwd” and “/etc/shadow” are typical Oconfs. Oconf is labeled with Confidentiality Flag (Fconf). 
Information flow Operation 
Processprocess Fork, signal, IPC 
Processfile Create, write 
Processdir Create, write 
Processsocket Create, write 
Fileprocess Read, execute 
Dirprocess  Read, execute 
Socketprocess Read 
  
Integrity Object (Ointe) is an object whose integrity should be protected even if the system is breached. Generally Ointe 
means binary files, important configuration files, important user data files and directories containing these files. Ointe is 
labeled with Integrity Flag (Finte). 
Availability Object (Oavai) is the limited resource that is necessary to run processes. Even if the system is breached, OS 
should guarantee that St do not block other vital or health processes getting Oavai. Oavai includes CPU, memory, disk space, 
network bandwidth and important kernel structures. Oavai is labeled with Availability Flag (Favai). 
In order to perfect the confidentiality protection function of STBAC, we further introduce two definitions. 
Leak Object (Oleak) is an executable file from which a process derived may leak secrecy while writing files after reading 
an Oconf. Typical examples are “cp”, “mcopy”, “dd”, “passwd”, and etc. 
Leak Subject (Sleak) is a process derived from Oleak that may leak secrecy while writing files after reading an Oconf. 
Both Oleak and Sleak are labeled with Leak Flag (Fleak). 
1.2.2 Vital Rules 
As presented above, STBAC identifies Oconf, Ointe, Oavai, Oleak and Sleak by vital flags of Fconf, Finte, Favai and Fleak 
respectively. Before running, OS configures vital flags by default or by the administrator; in running, vital flags should 
be spread automatically to avoid security vulnerability. Thus, four rules for spreading vital flags are designed as follows:  
Directory to Directory Vital Rule ( DirectoryDirectory econf FF   int,Dir-Dir :VR ) depicts that the new directory or file inherits Fconf 
and Finte from the parent directory at the creation time.  
Process to Process Vital Rule ( ocessocess leakconf FF PrPr:VR ,Proc-Proc   ) depicts that the new process inherits Fconf and Fleak from 
the parent process at the creation time. 
Process to File Vital Rule ( Fileocess confF Pr:VR File-Proc ) depicts that any file should inherit Fconf when it is created or 
modified by a process that has been labeled with Fconf and Fleak simultaneously. 
File to Process Vital Rule ( ocessFile leakconf FF Pr:VR ,Proc-File   ) depicts that any Sh should clean old Fconf and Fleak flags when 
executing a file, and then should inherit Fleak from the executable file. In addition, any Sh should possess Fconf after 
reading Oconf. 
1.3 Health 
The Health part consists of health objects (Oh) and health subjects (Sh). A Health Subject (Sh) is a process that has not 
been tainted or labeled as vital. A Health Object (Oh) is an object that has not been tainted or labeled as vital. The 
Health can access the Taint and the Vital, and vice versa. 
1.4 Protection 
Corresponding to the three security protection targets, confidentiality, integrity and availability, STBAC sets up three 
protection rules， which constitute the Protection part. 
Confidentiality Protection Rule (
conf
R
t OS :PR Conf ) forbids St to read Oconf, i.e. it forbids suspiciously tainted subjects 
to read sensitive files, to read or search sensitive directories, and to execute some privileged operations to destroy 
confidentiality, such as the “ptrace” system call. 
Integrity Protection Rule (
e
W
t OS intInte :PR  ) forbids St to write Ointe, i.e. it forbids suspiciously tainted subjects to 
modify, create, delete and rename a protected file or directory, and to execute some privileged operations to destroy 
integrity, such as the “create_module” and “setuid” system calls.  
Availability Protection Rule (
tHWMorRHWMR
A
avai SO
SYSSYSStSt 
:PR Avai ) forbids an Oavai-allocating operation if the operation 
could result in that the amount of allocated Oavai exceeds one of the two High Water Markers (HWM). One HWM is 
named HWMSt, which represents maximum amount of Oavai permitted for St to get. The other HWM, named HWMSYS, 
  
represents maximum percentage of allocated Oavai in the whole system. (RSt denotes the amount of Oavai allocated to St; 
and RSYS denotes the percentage of allocated Oavai in the whole system.) 
If treating STBAC and its members as sets, we can formally represent the STBAC model as follows: 
2. Model Analysis 
2.1 Protection Analysis 
2.1.1 Confidentiality 
PRconf of STBAC prevents St from reading Oconf for 
preserving confidentiality. However, as PRconf does not 
restrict Sh, there possibly exists an information flow that 
indirectly leaks secrecy, as shown in Figure 2(a). 
Although St cannot get secrecy information from Oconf 
directly, St can get it indirectly by the path of Oconf  Sh 
N-Oconf St. (N-Oconf denotes an object that has no 
secrecy, such as Oh, Ot, and other objects).  
This indirect leakage requires the participation of Sh, and it will not occur without Sh. In other words, it is difficult to leak 
secrecy only under remote user’s attack and without local user’s cooperation or misuse. The reason lies in that St cannot 
control Sh and shake off the tracing of taint rules simultaneously. Sometimes, St wants to control a Sh. By the operations 
of creating processes or executing files, or by IPC communications, St may succeed in controlling a Sh. However, 
according to the taint rules, these operations are bound to taint the Sh. 
In a system that users have a sense of security, the indirect leakage of sensitive information won’t happen. Nevertheless, 
we present three ways to prevent leaking sensitive information via user’s carelessness. 
 Relay-spread. After a Sh reads Oconf, Fconf is spread to Sh. While Sh further writes to an N-Oconf file, Fconf will be 
relay-spread to the file. Thus, by PRconf, St cannot read information from the file any more. Figure 2(b) shows this 
strategy. 
 Forbid-writing. After a Sh reads Oconf, Fconf is spread to Sh. If Sh wants to further write to an N-Oconf file, we forbid it. 
Figure 2(c) shows this strategy. 
 Selective-spread. After a Sh reads Oconf, Fconf is spread to Sh. When Sh further writes to an N-Oconf file, Fconf will be 
spread to the file only if the writing may cause secrecy leakage. Thus, by PRconf, St cannot read the file any more. 
Figure 2(d) shows this strategy. 
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From these figures, we can easily find that all three strategies can effectively cut off leaking paths. For relay-spread, there 
can be the problem of false leakage of sensitive information, i.e. after reading Oconf, the writing operation may not 
necessarily write sensitive information to N-Oconf. False leakage of sensitive information will bring rapidly many Oconfs 
into the system, however. As St cannot read Oconfs, St’s behavior will be restricted so that St cannot run normally. 
For forbid-writing, as it forbids writing from Sh to N-Oconf, we can rationally consider that Sh with Fconf has higher 
sensitive level than N-Oconf. This strategy is similar to the usual BLP model enforcement [15][16]. Certainly, 
forbid-writing can avoid the problem of false leakage of sensitive information, but to some extent this may also restrict 
Sh’s behavior so that Sh cannot run normally. 
For selective-spread, it always permits writing to N-Oconf, no matter whether it causes spreading Fconf to N-Oconf or not, 
hence it does not disturb Sh’s running. At the same time, it still can prevent leaking secrecy via spreading Fconf to N-Oconf 
when the writing may cause secrecy leakage. So the selective-spread approach is chosen in our model. 
The selective-spread strategy can be implemented using Fleak, VRproc-file and VRfile-proc that are described in Section 2. For 
instance, copying passwd file from /etc to /tmp can cause leaking secrecy. After executing the cp command file that is 
labeled with Fleak in advance, the process will inherit Fleak from the cp file according to VRfile-proc; when the process reads 
the passwd file labeled with Fconf, Fconf will be spread to the process by VRfile-proc; when the process subsequently creates a 
new file /tmp/passwd, Fconf will be further spread to the new file, thus the secrecy information in the new file will 
undoubtedly be protected. However, using the same cp command won’t spread Fconf if user copies an N-Oconf file to 
anywhere. Only if a process has both Fconf and Fleak can it spread Fconf. 
In summary, STBAC can prevent directly and indirectly leaking secrecy based on PRconf and selective-spread mechanism, 
so it can protect confidentiality well. 
2.1.2 Integrity 
According to the PRinte and taint rules, STBAC can meet the three conditions of the “Low-Water Mark Policy for 
Objects” in Biba’s model [6], which are: 
(1) Any subject (S) can read any object (O), regardless of their integrity levels (i). After reading, there will be i(s) = 
min(i(s), i(o)). 
(2) s∈S can write o∈O at any integrity level. After writing, there will be i(o) = min(i(s),i(o)); 
(3) s1∈S can execute s2∈S, only if i(s2)≤i(s1). 
By PRinte, we can reasonably confirm that i(St)=i(Ot)<i(Ointe)=i(Sh)=i(Oh). So the first condition can be satisfied by taint 
rules of TRsock-proc, TRproc-proc and TRexe-proc. The second condition can only be satisfied partially by the taint rule of 
TRproc-exe, because, after a St write to a Oh, STBAC will not downgrade i(Oh) when the Oh is not an executable file, this 
does not comply with the second condition. However, this will not be exploited by intruder for that PRinte can protect 
important executable files, configuration files and data files from being written by St. The third condition requires that 
low integrity level subject cannot execute high integrity level object, i.e. St cannot get a Sh if i(St)<i(Sh). In detail, 
according to TRproc-proc and TRexe-proc, though St can get a process by operations of creating processes or executing files, 
the process gotten by St surely is labeled with Ft. Thus the process gotten by St is also a St, but not a Sh. So, the third 
condition is met. 
In summary, STBAC basically satisfies the “Low-Water Mark Policy for Objects”, so that it can prevent integrity 
damage caused by intruder. 
2.1.3 Availability 
Availability protection is to prevent illegal blocking of accessing data or services [14]. The action tampering availability 
has been concluded as DOS [17]. STBAC can protect availability in two manners: 
First, from the perspective of OS, availability has to be built on the basis of integrity. Hence, STBAC protects firstly 
integrity of data, service configurations and system configurations by PRinte. 
  
Second, STBAC restricts allocation of resources by two HWMs, i.e. HWMSt and HWMSYS. HWMSt restricts the amount 
of resources allocated to each St. HWMSYS forbids allocating new resources to St when idle resources in the system is 
very few.  
However, availability protection still requires that the system can tolerate or recover from internal errors, external attacks, 
and even physical failures. Due to the shortage of access control mechanism, these requirements have to be met by 
error-recovery [18] or self-healing [19] mechanisms. 
2.2 Compatibility Analysis 
STBAC does not influence the actions of local users and remote users using Trustable-Communications. It also does not 
affect most actions of St, because STBAC only forbids St to illegally access vital resources, which are merely a small 
part of all the resources, and does not forbid St to legally access vital resources, such as reading and executing Ointe. 
Possible incompatibility can be caused by PRconf and PRinte since they restrict processes’ actions. But they do not restrict 
the user who logs in by Trustable-Communications. This means that the administrator can still manage the computer and 
upgrade application software remotely by Trustable-Communications. PRavai only restricts the resource allocation, and 
it’ll not restrict any normal action of a process if the two High Water Markers are configured properly. 
On most occasions, reading Oconf and modifying Ointe through Non-Trustable-Communications mean intrusions or 
network worms, and these should be forbidden by PRconf and PRinte. However, on special cases, we should permit 
processes using Non-Trustable-Communications to read Oconf or modify Ointe, which we call Shared-Oconf and 
Shared-Ointe respectively. And they introduce incompatibility. 
Shared-Ointe is usually a system configuration file that has to be modified by a process using 
Non-Trustable-Communications. Furthermore, the process cannot change to use Trustable-Communications. So the 
amount of Shared-Ointe is tiny. Shared-Ointe can not be a binary file, application configuration file or the majority of 
system configuration files, because we can use Trustable-Communications such as SSL, TSL and SSH to upgrade the 
system, patch software and modify configurations remotely. Only exceptional system configuration files have to be 
modified through Non-Trustable-Communications. In Linux, Shared-Ointe means /etc/resolve.conf, because dhcplient 
will write /etc/resolve.conf after receiving information from the remote DHCP server, whereas the communication 
between the DHCP client and server cannot use authentication or encryption. 
Timothy Fraser successfully resolved a problem like Shared-Ointe by setting trusted program [3]. Here we use a similar 
mechanism named Trustable-Communication-List, each entry of which consists of local program name, local IP and port, 
remote IP and port, network protocol and permitted time span. Information of remote communications that are needed 
when modifying Shared-Ointe is put in the Trustable-Communication-List. Only when a remote communication, which is 
ready to be launched, matches an entry in the list will it be regarded as trustable. This mechanism can resolve 
Shared-Ointe problem and assure security to some degree. 
Shared-Oconf are mainly the password files whose secrecy has to be shared by local processes and processes using 
Non-Trustable-Communications. Thus, the amount of Shared-Oconf is tiny. In Linux, Shared-Oconf includes /etc/passwd, 
/etc/shadow and /usr/local/apache/passwd/passwords. 
A mechanism named Partial-Copy is designed to resolve the Shared-Oconf problem. It generates a partial copy for each 
Shared-Oconf to save part of the Shared-Oconf content. The partial copy permits access by the processes using 
Non-Trustable-Communications. For example, we can build a partial copy of /etc/passwd to contain user information 
needed by process using Non-Trustable-Communications, but the information of privileged users and other important 
users stay in /etc/passwd and is forbidden to be accessed by Non-Trusted-Communication processes. In order to 
implement the Partial-Copy mechanism, the kernel should redirect the access target of Non-Trustable-Communication 
processes from Shared-Oconf to the corresponding partial copy. 
  
In summary, STBAC can get good compatibility because it only prevents St from illegally accessing vital resources. 
Though we have incompatibility problems from Shared-Oconf and Shared-Ointe, the amounts of these objects are tiny, and 
they can be resolved by the Trustable-Communication-List and Partial-Copy mechanisms. 
2.3 Simplicity Analysis 
Simplicity of STBAC derives from the fact that it is simple to administer and easy to understand. The main work for 
administering STBAC is to identify those files or directories that need to be protected and set vital flags. This is 
straightforward and easy to understand. As the system files and directories that need protection could be set vital flags 
automatically by the system, the user only needs to set his/her data files and directories. Taint flag can be generated and 
spread automatically by the kernel, and does not need any manual operations. Partial-Copy and 
Trustable-Communication-List may bring some additional work, but the work is limited because of the very small 
amount of Shared-Oconf and Shared-Ointe. 
3. Model Implementation 
We have implemented a STBAC 
prototype in the Linux kernel 
2.4.20 based on our former work. 
The general principle is to avoid 
significant reductions of 
simplicity, compatibility and 
performance of original Linux. 
Figure 3 shows the architecture. 
The total amount of the codes is 
less than five thousand lines, and 
most of them are located in 
kernel. 
Similar to the methodology of M. 
Abrams et al. [23], we divide the implementation into three parts: enforcement, decision and information. Separating 
model enforcement from model decision has the advantage of conveniently modifying and adding model rules without 
change of most codes, as described in [24]. The information part is not independent of the kernel, but is founded on 
modifying existing kernel structure. 
The enforcement part intercepts accesses at related system calls or important kernel functions, and issues requests to the 
decision part. For the protection requests, such as confidentiality protection requests, integrity protection requests or 
availability protection requests, the enforcement part permits or denies the access according to the result returned by the 
decision part. For the spread requests, such as taint spread requests and vital flag spread requests, the enforcement part 
does nothing after posting the requests, and the decision part directly modifies data structures of the information part. 
Table 2 describes the modified system calls and kernel functions, and the corresponding model rules. 
Fig.3. the enforcement of STBAC in Linux kernel
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Table 2 STBAC rules and system calls 
The decision part is a new kernel module that is built for 
handling requests from the enforcement part. While 
making a decision, it firstly reads the STBAC flags of 
subject and object from the information part, and then 
calls corresponding module rules for deciding whether 
to permit the access and whether to modify the STBAC 
flags in the kernel data structure. In the case of denying 
the access, the decision part will try to redirect the 
access to the partial copy. If the access is from 
sys_socket, it will search 
Trustable-Communication-List to affirm whether the 
access opens a Trustable-Communication. The process 
will not be labeled with Ft if the communication is 
trustable. 
The information part saves and maintains all kinds of 
STBAC flags of subjects and objects. There can be two 
implementation options: one is to build independently 
STBAC data structures for saving flags, and the other is 
to use the existing kernel data structures for saving flags. 
The main advantage of the former one is that it is 
independent of Linux kernel codes, but the disadvantage 
is that it will lose performance significantly; the latter one can use kernel functions to organize and maintain data 
structures so that it is easy to be implemented and has little performance reduction. The latter one is adopted. 
In addition, we created four commands: stbac_set_flag, stbac_get_flag, stbac_admin_trusted_comm and 
stbac_admin_partial_copy. The stbac_set_flag and stbac_get_flag are used to set and get all kinds of STBAC flags. They 
can operate on all files and directories under a directory at a time, or operate on all descendants of a process at a time. We 
also created a shell script named “stbac_init” to automatically initiate and check the STBAC flags for system directories 
and files when booting the system. 
All partial copies are saved under “./stbac”. The password and user management commands are modified to synchronize 
Shared-Ointe with its partial copy automatically.  
4. Model Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the STBAC model, we tested the STBAC prototype system from three aspects: protection capability, 
compatibility and performance. We prepared two Linux machines using RedHat 9.0 whose kernel was 2.4.20-8. One is 
for attacking, named attacker, with IP 192.1.1.2; the other is the attacked machine, named victim, with IP 192.1.1.1. On 
the victim, the directories and files to be protected confidentially are /home/szy/data, /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, while 
the directories and files to be protected integrally are /boot, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /lib, /usr/lib, /dev/kmem and 
/etc. 
4.1 Protection Test 
Three tests were designed, “remote-user”, “web-downloaded-program” and “remote-attack”, to verify if STBAC can 
forbid the remote users who logged in by Non-Trustable-Communications, web-downloaded programs and intruders to 
illegally access vital resources. 
For the convenience of analyzing the test result, the printk() function is called in STBAC-enforced kernel to log every 
step of intrusion. Function printk() is located in the STBAC decision part, and has the calling form of printk(“<4>subject, 
Model rules Functions 
TRsock-proc sys_socket 
TRproc-proc 
sys_fork,sys_vfork,sys_clone,sys_pipe,sys_map,sys
_shmat,sys_msgrcv,sys_mkfifo,sys_mknod 
TRproc-exe sys_open,sys_create,sys_chmod,sys_fchmod 
Taint R
ules 
TRexe-proc sys_execve,sys_mmap 
VRdir-dir sys_open,sys_create,sys_mkdir,sys_mknod 
VRproc-proc sys_fork,sys_vfork,sys_clone 
VRfile-proc sys_execve 
V
ital rules 
VRproc-file Sys_open, sys_create 
PRconf sys_open,sys_ptrace,sys_get_stbac_attr 
PRinte 
sys_open,sys_truncate,sys_ftruncate,sys_chmod,sys
_fchmod,sys_chown,sys_fchown,sys_lchown,sys_r
mdir,sys_rename,sys_unlink,sys_mount,sys_umoun
t,sys_setrlimit,sys_reboot,sys_swapoff,sys_create_
module,sys_delete_module,sys_setuid,sys_setgid,sy
s_setfsuid,sys_setfsgid,sys_set_stbac_attr, sys_kill 
Protection rules 
PRavai 
Sys_setrlimit,sock_recvmsg,sock_sendmsg,sys_brk,
schedule, ext3_alloc_block, ext2_alloc_block 
  
object, operation, parameter, result”). After every test, we analyzed the logs and drew the dependency graph with the 
same notations as that in Figure 1. 
4.1.1 remote-user 
First, a user who logged in as root identity from local created a new file of new_command under /sbin directory, and 
copied the passwd file to /tmp directory. Then, a user logged in from remote, changed identity to root by su command, 
tried to modify the new_command file’s access right bits, and tried to read the /tmp/passwd file. The test result is shown 
in Figure 4. The vi process launched by local user’s bash is a health subject. It creates a new file /sbin/new_command 
which inherits Finte flag from parent directory /sbin by VRdir-dir rule. The cp process is also launched by local user’s bash, 
inherits Fleak flag from the cp file when executing the cp file by VRfile-proc rule It inherits Fconf flag from /etc/passwd when 
reading /etc/passwd by VRfile-proc rule, and spreads Fconf flag to /tmp/passwd when creating /tmp/passwd by VRproc-file rule. 
The remote user’s vi process inherits Ft flag by TRsock-proc and TRproc-proc rules, then it is refused by PRconf rule when it 
tries to read /tmp/passwd file. The remote user’s chmod process also inherits Ft flag by TRsock-proc and TRproc-proc rules, it is 
refused by PRinte rule when it tries to modify the attribute of the /sbin/new_command file. 
So, vital rules can automatically spread vital flags to vital objects and subjects; taint rules can automatically trace remote 
user’s activities in kernel; and protection rules of PRconf and PRinte can forbid remote users to get secrecy or to change 
integrity information. That is, even if a remote user has gotten root identity through some ways, i.e., 
Non-Trustable-Communications, his/her illegal activities are still prevented by protection rules. 
4.1.2 web-downloaded-program 
We designed two little programs for downloading. One program named consume-cpu consumes cpu time by an infinite 
loop; the other program named consume-mem uses up memory by non-stop memory allocation. These two programs 
were put on the attacker machine and could be downloaded from the web. Figure 5 shows the test result. 
As Mozilla process is a St, consume-cpu and consume-mem downloaded by a local user are both Ot by TRproc-exe rule. 
When a user runs consume-cpu program, the new process of consume-cpu becomes St by TRexe-proc rule. When the time 
exceeds, the process will be stopped by PRavai rule. When the user runs consume-mem, the new process of consume-mem 
becomes St by TRexe-proc rule. After excessive memory has been allocated, subsequent allocation operations of 
consume-mem are refused by PRavai rule. 
So, taint rules can trace activities of web-downloaded programs in kernel, and PRavai rule can prevent web-downloaded 
programs from occupying excessive resources. 
4.1.3 remote-attack 
This test uses real attack tools to attack the victim machine from the attacker machine. It takes seven steps: 1) Attack 
samba to get root shell; 2) Kill syslogd process to stop system log service; 3) Get user’s important files to gain user’s 
Fig.4. Remote-user test                         Fig.5. Web-downloaded program test 
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secrecy; 4) Get passwd and shadow files to crack user’s password; 5) Build SUID shell file for convenience of next login; 
6) Download and install the hack tool, knark, to leave back-door in the victim; 7) Clean logs. 
Samba’s version is 2.2.8 and it suffers buffer overflow vulnerability by which the intruder can get root shell. Knark is a 
famous root-kit whose idea derives from [25], and it will add a kernel module to Linux. Att-samba is an experimental 
attack tool that is modified from a network-downloaded program. /home/szy/data is an important data file that the 
intruder wants to get. 
The attack progress is shown in Figure 6. Corresponding to the attack steps of 2~6, we can analyze the test result as 
follows: 2) By PRinte rule, STBAC forbids the tainted process of kill to call function sys_kill() to cease the health process 
syslogd; 3) By PRconf rule, STBAC forbids the tainted process of cat to read the Oconf file /home/szy/data; 4) By PRconf 
rule, STBAC forbids the tainted process of cat to read the Oconf file passwd and shadow; 5) By PRinte rule, STBAC 
forbids the tainted process of cp to create a new file under /lib which is an Ointe. Although the intruder creates 
successfully a SETUID shell under current directory afterwards, the shell file created is an Ot. The shell will fail in 
executing the privileged operation setuid by PRinte rule. 6) By PRinte rule, STBAC forbids the tainted process of mv to 
create a new file knark.o under directory of /lib/modules/2.4.20-8/kernel/drivers/net which is an Ointe. At the same time, 
STBAC forbids the tainted process of insmod to call sys_create_module() function. 
As is shown above, attack steps of 2 to 6 all failed. Since these five steps are critical to the intrusion, we can say that 
STBAC has defeated the intrusion. During this, STBAC uses TRsock-proc, TRproc-proc and TRproc-exe to trace activities of the 
intruder in kernel, and uses PRconf and PRinte to prevent the intruder who has gotten root identity to gain secrecy, to 
modify files and to leave backdoors. 
These three tests validated all of the taint rules, vital rules and protection rules. By taint rules STBAC can trace activities 
of remote users, web-downloaded programs and intruders in the OS kernel. By vital rules STBAC can spread vital flags 
to subjects and objects which need protection. Based on spreading taint flags and vital flags, protection rules can prevent 
invalid actions of St, thus protecting confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
4.2 Compatibility Test 
On the STBAC-enforced Linux kernel 2.4.20-8, we have run many network applications and local applications without 
Fig.6. Remote-attack test 
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incompatible problems. Table 3 shows the applications. For testing remote management, we used Webmin and SSH to 
manage user accounts, file system, network and services from remote computers. For testing remote upgrading, we used 
up2date to upgrade RedHat Linux from RedHat website. As Webmin, SSH and up2date all have authentication and 
encrypted communication, i.e., they run on Trustable-Communications, STBAC does not restrict any action of them. 
Table 3 Compatibility test 
4.3  Performance Test 
STBAC has little impact on Linux 
performance. First, the decision rules are 
simple as they only compare flags on the 
subject and object; second, getting decision 
data is also fast in that decision data are saved 
in the control block of the current process or 
inodes of the currently opened files or 
directories. In the performance test, we 
compared the performance of two kernels: the original Linux kernel and the STBAC-enforced kernel. The comparison 
was done in two environments: non-St environment and St-existing environment. 
4.3.1 Non-St Environment 
In this test, we applied the “kernel compile” [29] testing approach. The “kernel compile” is a broadly accepted method 
for testing the general performance of Linux. The test uses “victim” as the test machine, and uses the default 
configuration for kernel compiling. The victim is a 1.1GHz Intel Celeron machine with 256M sized main memory, and 
100MHz DRAM clock. 
Table 4 Test results for compiling Linux kernel (Sec) 
Table 4 shows the results. Non-STBAC 
and STBAC indicate respectively the 
original Linux kernel and the 
STBAC-enforced Linux kernel. Unlike 
[29] and [28], we recorded the User-time 
and System-time as well as the Real-time. 
As the model is implemented in kernel 
and the Real-time is easily influenced by 
random environment factors, we focus on the System-time instead of the Real-time. In Table 4, the System-time of the 
STBAC-enforced kernel increased 1.7% compared with that of the non-STBAC kernel. The comparison test was run 
three times. Similar results were obtained. The first run of the test was done with “cold-cache” while the other two were 
in “warm-cache”. So the Real-time in the first run was more than that of the other two, since the first compiling has to 
read a great deal of files from disk while the last two compilings can read many files from memory or disk swapping 
area. 
4.3.2 St-existing Environment 
As St comes from network communication, we designed two UDP communication programs for this test. One was 
installed on the victim machine as a client; the other was installed on the attacker machine as a server. The client sent 
UDP request package to the server. After receiving the answer package from the server, the client resent the same UDP 
package to the server. It repeated sending 100,000 packages to the server and receiving 100,000 packages from the server. 
Network application Local application 
Network 
services 
Remote 
management 
Remote 
Upgrading 
Developmen
t 
Desktop System 
management
apache, mysql, 
samba, ftp, 
telnet, mozilla, 
dhcp, rlogin, 
sendmail 
Webmin 
(use ssl), ssh 
up2date 
(use ssl) 
Kernel 
compiling, 
gcc, gdb, vi, 
QT 
KDE , 
GNOME  
df, top, free, 
useradd, 
pstree, 
mount, tar, 
passwd, etc.
Kernel Time categories 1 2 3 Average 
Real 444.652 426.104 425.167 431.9743 
User 393.370 393.780 392.680 393.2767 
Non- 
STBAC 
System 27.550 27.280 28.470 27.76667 
Real 445.804 427.457 427.894 433.7183 
User 393.890 393.680 394.070 393.88 STBAC 
System 28.340 28.100 28.280 28.24 
  
The result showed that each cycle consumed 124.4 microseconds on the non-STBAC kernel and 130.1 microseconds on 
the STBAC-enforced kernel. Compared with the non-STBAC kernel, the STBAC-enforced kernel demonstrated a 4.6% 
increase of the consumed time. 
Based on the above tests, we can safely say that the STBAC-enforced Linux can protect effectively important directories, 
files and processes without significant impact on compatibility and performance. Performance reduction is only around 
1.7% to 4.6%. 
5. Related Works 
5.1 Relations with DTE 
DTE, proposed by Lee Badger et al. [30][1], is implemented in Linux by Serge Hallyn et al. [28], and is also adopted by 
SE-Linux [22]. It groups processes into domains, and groups files into types, and restricts access from domains to types 
as well as from domains to other domains. In a predefined condition, a process can switch its domain from one to 
another. 
STBAC can be viewed as a type of dynamic DTE. It divides all processes into two domains: St and Sh, and divides all 
objects into five types: Ot, Oh, Ointe, Oconf and Oavai; It defines access rights of each domain: Sh can access any object; St 
can access any object except reading Oconf, writing Ointe and allocating excessive Oavai; Sh can switch to St by taint rules. 
Dynamic characteristic of STBAC is reflected in that both domains and types in STBAC can change dynamically during 
the system execution, but in DTE only domains can change and types cannot change. Domains and types change in 
STBAC according to the taint rules, which are automatically triggered by the intruder’s activities in the system. However, 
domain changing in DTE takes place when executing the entry point file that needs administrator’s predefinition. 
Due to this dynamic characteristic of STBAC, administration work is dramatically decreased. Users do not need to 
predefine which subject is Sh or St, and which object is Oh or Ot. These definitions are automatically done by the taint 
rules during system execution. 
5.2 Intrusion Backtracking in OS 
Another related work is the intrusion backtracking in OS. In 2003, S.T.King and P.M.Chen built an effective intrusion 
backtracking and analyzing tool named Backtracker [13][10]. It can help administrators to find intrusion steps with the 
help of the dependency graph that is generated by logging and analyzing OS events. Zhu and Chiueh built a repairable 
file service named RFS [11], which supports kernel logging to allow roll-back of any file update operation, and keeps 
track of inter-process dependencies to quickly determine the extent of system damage after an attack/error. In 2005, 
Ashvin Goel and Kenneth Po built an intrusion recovery system named taser [12], which helps in selectively recovering 
file-system data after an attack. It determines the set of tainted file-system objects by creating dependencies among 
sockets, processes and files based on the entries in the system audit log. These works all focus on the intrusion analysis 
and recovery by logging system activities, and directly inspired the taint rules of STBAC. The most distinctive point in 
our work is that our objective is to build an access control mechanism that can trace and block intrusions in real time. 
5.3 Tainted Data Analysis 
The third related work is tainted data analysis. In 2005, James Newsome and Dawn Song built a detection tool named 
TaintCheck [26], which performs dynamic taint analysis on a program by running the program in its own emulation 
environment. In 2006, Alex Ho and Michael Fetterman et al. built a taint-based protection system [27] that traces tainted 
data in a Virtual-Machine-and-hardware-emulation-combined environment. STBAC differs from these two works in the 
following ways: (1) the meaning of the taint is different. Taint in STBAC isn’t tainted data, but tainted OS objects or 
subjects, such as tainted processes or tainted files; (2) the method of tracing taint is different. STBAC traces taint on the 
basis of the operations between OS-level subjects and objects, for example processes reading files or sockets. But these 
two works are both based on hardware-level instructions, such as LOAD, STORE and MOVE; (3) the objective is 
different. STBAC tries to prevent illegal actions of tainted subjects, while these two works try to detect intrusions. 
  
5.4 Information-Flow-Based Access Control 
Asbestos [31] and HiStar [20] are both information-flow-based access control. They label data with its owner, track 
information as it moves around in OS, and base access control decision on the labels. Our work differs from Asbestos’ in 
two points. First, Asbestos aims to isolate users from each other, thus to prevent illegal access to user data; STBAC 
exploits DAC to isolate users and uses mandatory protection rules to forbid St to illegally access vital resources which 
contain not only user data but also important system files, directories and privileges. Second, Asbestos uses user-related 
labels to trace data flow. This has to use “event process” and “label”, which increase complexity and consume excessive 
resources. STBAC uses simple flags and taint rules to trace St’s activities, so the implementation is simple and impact to 
performance is kept at a minimum. 
5.5 Linux Security Enhancement 
There are several famous Linux security enhancement projects, such as SELinux [22], LIDS [4], DTE [28], systrace [21], 
LOMAC [2][3], and etc. SELinux is a powerful Linux security enhancement project. It can flexibly support multiple 
security policies. But for general users, it is difficult to bring into play, because it requires professional knowledge on the 
part of the user. LOMAC has similar ideas with ours. It implements the Low-Water-Mark model [6] in Linux kernel, and 
aims to bring simple but useful MAC integrity protection to Linux. It maintains good compatibility with existing 
software. But LOMAC does not consider safeguarding confidentiality and usability. 
If having interest, please also read our other papers [32]-[71]. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we present a new OS access control model named STBAC. It consists of four parts: Taint, Health, Vital and 
Protection. The Taint might be controlled by an intruder and consists of St, Ot and taint rules which can trace activities of 
St. The Vital should be protected properly as it represents vital resources which are the valuable user data and the 
foundation for system to provide services, hence vital resources usually become the final targets of an intrusion. The 
Protection consists of three mandatory protection rules that forbid St to illegally access vital resources. The Health is not 
tainted nor labeled as vital ones, and it can access the Taint and the Vital. 
STBAC have reached its four goals: protecting vital resources, compatible with existing software, simple to administer 
and good performance. For protecting vital resources, analysis shows that STBAC is capable of forcibly protecting 
confidentiality, integrity and partial availability. The three protection tests further validated this experimentally. For 
compatibility, analysis shows that STBAC does not influence the actions of local users and remote users using 
Trustable-Communications. Remote administrator can still manage the computer and upgrade application software 
through Trustable-Communications. In addition, STBAC does not influence most actions of St, because it only forbids St 
to illegally access vital resources. Compatibility exceptions come from Shared-Oconf and Shared-Ointe, which are of tiny 
amounts and Trustable-Communication-List and Partial-Copy mechanisms can be used to resolve them. The test on 
application compatibility validated this goal experimentally. For simplicity, analysis shows that the main administration 
work of STBAC is to set vital flags for user files and directories that need to be protected, which is straightforward and 
easy to understand. The vital flags of system files and directories can be automatically labeled by a shell script 
“stbac_init” when booting the system. Ft is automatically generated and propagated by kernel and does not require any 
manual operation. For performance, tests in both non-St environment and St-existing environment showed that there is 
merely 1.7%~4.6% performance reduction caused by STBAC. 
Therefore, the STBAC model is useful in OS to defeat network attacks while maintaining good compatibility, simplicity 
and system performance. 
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